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The  operating  room  (OR)  is a high-risk  complex  setting,  where  patient  safety  relies  on  the  coordinated
efforts  of multiple  team  members.  However,  little attention  has  been  paid  to evaluating  the  strategies
employed  by  OR practitioners  to prevent  and  correct  incidents  that  inevitably  occur  during  surgery.
Therefore,  we  were  prompted  to  investigate  human  factor  (HF)  engineering  methods  that  have  been  used
in an  innovative  way  in  order  to  systematically  observe  and  analyze  the  management  of  incidents  in the
neurosurgical  OR  of  a French  university  hospital.  A technical  case  report  illustrates  our approach  that
associates  the following  procedures:  the  recording  of  OR team  member  activities  and  behaviour  by  video
cameras  and  direct  observation  of a HF  researcher,  with  the  description  and  the  explicit  demonstration  of
safety related  procedures  in self-  and cross-confrontation  interviews  of OR team  members.  This  technical
report emphasizes  complementary  aspects  of  clinical  performance  related  to safety  skills.  Moreover,
individual  and  team  performances  rely  on complementary  abilities  that associate  practical  knowledge,
skills,  and  attitudes,  which  are  engaged  at various  degrees  to prevent  and  manage  incidents.  This  report
also  enlightens  new  quality-improvement  opportunities  as well  as further  objectives  for  future  studies.
© 2013  Elsevier  Masson  SAS. All  rights  reserved.
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Le  bloc  opératoire  est un  environnement  complexe,  où  la  sécurité  du  patient  repose  sur les  efforts
coordonnés  de  tous  les  membres  de  l’équipe  chirurgicale.  Néanmoins,  les  stratégies  déployées  par  ces
professionnels  pour  prévenir  et corriger  les  incidents,  qui  surviennent  inévitablement,  ont jusqu’à  présent
été peu  étudiées.  Nous  décrivons  une méthode  ergonomique  originale,  utilisée  pour  observer  et analyser
la gestion  des  « erreurs  » au bloc  de  neurochirurgie.  Nous  avons  choisi,  pour  exemple  illustratif,  le cas
d’une  patiente  de 70 ans,  opérée  d’une  tumeur  cérébrale.  L’activité  et les  comportements  des  mem-
bres  de  l’équipe  chirurgicale  ont  été  observés  par  un  chercheur  en  ergonomie,  et enregistrés  par  des
caméras vidéo  HD.  Les  erreurs  commises  ont  été recensées  et  catégorisées  : 66  %  étaient  purement  liées
à  la  performance  clinique  ;  33  % impliquaient  (au  moins  partiellement)  la  communication  ou  la  gestion
organisationnelle.  Les  actions  a
au  cours  d’entretiens  personna
procédures  en cours  et  à la  ch
gérer  les  erreurs  : les  connais
fois), le savoir  être  (cité  8  fois).
opératoire ; les  diverses  compé
Abbreviations: OR, operating room; ICU, intensive care unit; D2, two  days after the op
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuchi.2013.05.001ssociées  à la  sécurité  du  patient  ont,  par suite,  été  explicitées  et  analysées
lisés,  au  cours  desquels  les  professionnels  du  bloc  ont fait  86 références  aux
eck-list.  Ils  se sont  appuyés  sur des  compétences  complémentaires  pour
sances  pratiques  (citées  25  fois),  les  compétences  techniques  (citées  21
 Nous  avons  détaillé  une  méthode  innovante  d’analyse  des  erreurs  au  bloc
tences  mises  en  œuvre  dans  la  gestion  de  ces  erreurs  ont été explicitées
©  2013  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous  droits  réservés.
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Success is not ﬁnal, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue
that counts
Sir Winston Churchill
. Introduction
Previous epidemiological studies from several industrialized
ountries (e.g., US [1,2] and Western Europe [3–6]) have shown
hat:
approximately 3% to 4% of hospitalized patients suffer a serious
adverse event;
surgical adverse events account for 48% of all adverse events;
almost half to two-thirds of these adverse events are preventable.
Consequently, patient safety has received increased attention.
t is now accepted that the operating room (OR) is an inherently
igh-risk environment and improving patient safety often involves
he coordinated efforts of multiple members of the healthcare
eam. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to these strate-
ies adopted to manage risks among health professionals. In a
rescient and seminal paper published in 1994, Leape [7] argued
hat if healthcare providers were to succeed in reducing errors
n hospital care, they would need to fundamentally change the
ay they think about errors. The author subsequently stated that
he solutions to the problem of medical error would not primar-
ly lie within medicine, but in the discipline of human factors
nd ergonomics (HF&E). Indeed, HF&E is a multidisciplinary ﬁeld
ncorporating contributions from psychology, engineering, indus-
rial design, graphic design, statistics, operations research and
nthropometry. In essence it is the study of designing equipment
nd devices that ﬁt the human body and its cognitive abilities.
F&E provide prospective data in collective and qualitative analy-
is methods, which have been used in elite sports [8] and high-risk
ndustries (e.g., commercial aviation, nuclear safety, aerospace)
o study team performance. To obtain a better understanding of
atient safety practice in the OR, we attempted to systematically
escribe the management of incidents by the OR team as observed
n their natural setting, and then interpreted by these care providers
i.e. surgeons, anaesthesiologists, nurses) in a video-based self- and
ross-confrontation interviews. Our aim was to perform a qualita-
ive analysis of events/errors, in order to identify the root causes
nd understand how they may  be harmful to the patient. In the
resent report, we describe the methodology developed for further
rospective studies, providing one illustrated case.
. Technical case illustration
.1. Research setting
The present observational and analytical pilot research study
as conducted in the OR of Toulouse university hospital in the
epartment of neurosurgery, according to the principles of the
eclaration of Helsinki. Because it was an observational quality-
mprovement case study with no change in our current clinical
ractice, neither approval of the ethics committee nor informed
onsent was required according to French law. The experiment was
eviewed by the Communication Board of our institution, then pre-
ented and clearly explained to the OR senior management and
R staff in advance. A representative sample of OR team mem-
ers consented to participate to the study. All participants had been
reviously informed of the quality-improvement and educational
urpose of the study, and gave their written informed consent to
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2.2. Operation proﬁle
A routine elective case of brain tumour surgery was  chosen for
the following reasons: craniotomy for a brain tumour is a com-
mon neurosurgical procedure that is regularly performed in the
department; it requires classic microsurgical technical skills [9];
its indications have been well deﬁned in literature as well as its
complications [10].
A 70-year-old woman  was  operated on for a right frontal menin-
gioma of the skull convexity. Her basic preoperative complaint
was headaches. The patient’s ASA score was 2. The surgical team
was composed of the following care providers: a staff surgeon,
a chief resident surgeon, a resident surgeon, a staff anaesthesi-
ologist, a resident anaesthesiologist, a scrub nurse, a circulating
nurse, and an nurse anaesthetist. Staff doctors and nurses were all
entirely familiar with the surgical procedure with the exception
of one nurse, who was less trained in neurosurgery. All team
members, except the residents, were permanent members of the
neurosurgical department.
The anaesthesia was induced with sufentanyl and propofol.
Curare was  administered to facilitate the tracheal intubation. The
patient received standard monitoring that included invasive and
non-invasive arterial blood pressure, continuous electrocardio-
gram, pulse oximetry, oesophageal temperature, urine output, and
end-tidal CO2 as well as anaesthetic concentrations. The anaesthe-
sia was maintained with a propofol infusion during the procedure
that consisted of a right frontal craniotomy (performed by the chief
resident) and extra-axial tumour resection (performed by the staff
neurosurgeon).
After the operation, the patient was transferred to the neuro-
surgical ICU as standard procedure. Pathological report suggested
a WHO-grade-2 atypical meningioma. A transient confusion was
observed at D1 (one day after surgery), which was partly attributed
to steroids and opioids. The patient was  able to walk 2 days after
the operation, and was rapidly discharged following a normal
neurological examination. Postoperative CT revealed a parenchy-
mal  hypo-density at the surgical site, and a contralateral subdural
collection. At D19, the patient was admitted for headaches and con-
fusion and was operated on for a left sided subdural haematoma,
which alleviated the symptoms.
2.3. Data collection and analysis
The study was  performed according to the HF&E approach (Seri-
ous Game Research Network), and the researcher (JFC) trained to
analyze professional behaviours of healthcare workers in the OR.
Firstly, the HF&E researcher prospectively collected observa-
tional data, which consisted of digital recordings obtained from 3
digital video cameras, placed to record team member behaviour
and activities, supplemented with direct observations using
ethnographic ﬁeld note methods [11]. A working group composed
of a staff neurosurgeon, a staff anaesthesiologist, and the HF&E
researcher analyzed the video-recordings and ﬁeld notes. They
recorded a total of 18 failures, which were characterized according
to a standardized terminology and classiﬁcation schema [12],
including their type and cause (Table 1). Major as well as minor
incidents were analyzed (e.g., major incident that prolongs hospi-
talization, and/or leads to additional and not planned diagnostic
procedure(s) or treatment(s); also the patient is often physically
injured) [4].
Overall, 66% of these failures were basically related to clinical
performance, whereas 33% involved communication or patient
management, at least partially. Technical skills were the root
cause of nearly 90% of the failures that occurred during the
pre-intervention phase and 45% (4/9) of the failures during the
intervention phase, whereas communication failures represented
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Table 1
Incidents collected during the surgical procedure.
Incidents relevés au cours de l’intervention chirurgicale.
Meaning unit Subtype Type Cause
Resident anesthetist induced anesthesia too fast Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Nurse  did not install the mute assistant correctly Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Chief  resident stapled the drapes, what the staff surgeon
he assisted never does so
Questionable interpretation Communication Organizational, organizational culture,
communication channels
Chief  resident did not install the sucker correctly Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Nurse’s  gloved hand touched non-sterile areas (four times) Procedure contraindicated Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Nurse  made a hole in the drape with the scalpel Procedure contraindicated Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
The  size of the craniotomy performed by the chief resident
was  inadequate
Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance
Patient management
Human, practitioner, skill-based,
organizational, organizational culture,
chain of command
Blood  pressure (BP) monitoring did not function properly,
since the position of the arterial catheter was not optimal
Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Nurse  did not install the cottonoids provider as expected
by the surgeon
Incomplete information Communication Organizational, organizational culture,
communication channels
Brain  swelling occurred Correct procedure with
complication
Clinical performance
Communication
Human, practitioner, skill-based
Organizational, organizational culture,
communication channels
Transfer of knowledge
Supervision and training
Patient moved after resident anesthetist leaned on the
operating table
Procedure contraindicated Clinical performance Human, practitioner, rule-based
Surgeon turned his back to the scrub nurse Questionable interpretation Communication Human, practitioner, unclassiﬁable
Vascular clip felt when scrub nurse passed it to the surgeon Correct procedure incorrectly
performed
Clinical performance Human, practitioner, skill-based
Skull  screws and plates were unavailable for closure Incomplete information Communication Technical, facilities, materials
availability
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aThe  count of cottonoids was not performed Omission of esse
procedure
nly 10% of failures during the pre-intervention phase but
ccounted for 55% of the failures during the intervention phase. Res-
dents (both surgeon and anaesthetist) and the less trained nurse
ere involved in 100% of the skill-based failures. The staff surgeon
s well as the staff anaesthetist and the chief resident were involved
Fig. 1. Incidents and corrections rel
Schéma relatif aux erreurs liées a
Adapted from Chang eClinical performance Negligence
in 100% of the failures related to patient management and lack of
communication.
A framework was  used to deﬁne the parameters of failures
and to better understand their management by the team. Over-
all, all incidents but one (94%) were corrected or at least mitigated
ated to sterility maintenance.
u maintien de la stérilité.
t al., 2005 [12].
J.-F. Couat et al. / Neurochirurgie 59 (2013) 142–148 145
Fig. 2. Incidents and corrections related to brain swelling. This diagram shows minor incidents or hazardous conditions that could have contributed to cause major incidents
either  directly or indirectly by interacting with their correction or mitigation (e.g. a large and highly vascularized tumour implies a risk of excess bleeding, also, to let
vascular clips fall on the ﬂoor, when handing it to the surgeon who is performing the hemostasis, causes delay in actions, and can then indirectly contribute to bleeding):
squares: causes or incidents/events; circles: actions engaged to mitigate events; roles of participants, the size of the circle is proportional to the engagement of the participant
necessary to perform the action (e.g. surgeon accomplish the hemostasis, whereas anaesthetists process the transfusion); arrows represents interactions between causes
and  incidents/events or actions engaged to correct or mitigate incidents.
Schéma relatif aux incidents en rapports avec l’œdème cérébral. Il montre le lien potentiel entre des circonstances particulières ou des incidents mineurs et des événements indésirables
graves. Par exemple, une tumeur richement vascularisée implique un risque de saignement peropératoire ; par ailleurs, la perte de temps liée à un défaut de coordination dans le
passage  d’un clip nécessaire pour faire l’hémostase, peut aussi indirectement contribuer à une majoration du saignement : carrés : causes des incidents/événements ; cercles : actions
engagées pour les corriger et acteurs impliqués ; la taille du cercle est proportionnelle au niveau d’engagement de l’acteur dans l’action considérée : par exemple, le chirurgien fait
directement l’hémostase, tandis que l’anesthésiste transfuse). Les ﬂèches représentent les interactions entre les causes des incidents/événements et les actions engagées pour les
p
A
w
m
i
d
s
t
o
r
t
a
t
(
r
t
s
[
r
s
(
(
orévenir  ou les corriger.
dapted from Chang et al., 2005 [12].
ithin a variable delay and with a variable participation of the team
embers. Failures related to maintaining sterility, which mainly
nvolved the nurses, who always made correctable errors with no
elay (Fig. 1). Failures related to the installation of the surgical
etup were corrected with delay since it implied the coopera-
ion of the more experienced staff surgeon and his appreciation
f optimal setting partially related to his personal approach. The
esident anaesthetist, who adjusted the position of the operating
able, immediately corrected any error. More complex failures that
re shown in Fig. 2 had been interacting and therefore contributed
o two adverse events that took place in the postoperative course
i.e., the development of a symptomatic subdural haematoma that
equired a second operation, and anaemia that required blood
ransfusion). The counting of cottonoids that was not done was  the
ole non-corrected incident.
Secondly, the HF researcher conducted confrontation interviews
13], in which team members were presented with the OR video-
ecordings. The latter were asked not only to comment on what they
aw but also to express, and clarify the reasons for their actions
i.e., self-confrontation) as well as those of other team members
i.e., cross-confrontation). Interviews were audio recorded. Because
f time constraints the video-recordings were shortened to themost informative sequences (i.e., < 20 min) by the aforementioned
working group (i.e., staff neurosurgeon, staff anaesthesiologist, and
HF&E researcher using Studio 12 [Pinacle software]), so that the
self-confrontation interviews lasted no more than 60 minutes.
These were transcribed verbatim by the interviewer and enabled
the participants to conﬁrm the validity of the transcription. All
references to safety practice were noted. Qualitative analysis was
made to understand the management of failures, and particularly
ways of preventing and mitigating them effectively.
When they watched the videos and were confronted with their
behaviour and activities, team members detected all incidents. The
surgeon, the two anaesthetists and the two nurses respectively ver-
balized seven, 13 and 10 incidents they were directly involved in,
while they verbalized six, eight and 12 incidents they were not
directly involved in.
Describing their behaviours and activities, all team members
spontaneously and regularly referred to the institutional proce-
dures in use in the OR at the time of the operation: 22 references
were noted for the surgeon, 19 for the two  anaesthetists, and 45
for the two  nurses. The World Health Organization surgical safety
checklist [14] was  the most cited procedure, followed by the one
related the prevention of surgical site infections. Procedures were
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Fig. 3. Proﬁle of competencies engaged by operating room (OR) team members to manage incidents. Attitude refers to the behaviour aspects that allow team members to
conduct themselves as care providers, and to master the attitudes, either personal or professional that could eventually enable them to practice professionally. Skills refer
to  the clinical and technical capacity that enable team members to act in the OR effectively. Knowledge refers to the professional knowledge that allows team members to
think  and act in a professional manner.
Proﬁl des compétences mises en œuvre par les professionnels du bloc pour gérer les erreurs ou incidents. Attitude renvoie aux aspects comportementaux qui permettent aux membres de
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l’équipe  de se conduire en tant que prestataires de soins, et de maîtriser les attitudes, qu’el
envoie  aux capacités cliniques et techniques qui permettent aux membres de l’équipe d’
ui  permet aux membres de l’équipe de penser et d’agir de manière professionnelle.
voked to prevent failures. For example, a nurse said: “it is an
nstitutional protocol, we catheterize all patients before opera-
ions of over two hours’ duration” or “all nurses are using two
airs of gloves, which is a recommendation from the Local Noso-
omial Infections Surveillance Committee”. The anaesthesiologists
lso evoked procedures in the correction or mitigation of all but
ne of the incidents they were involved in.
Commenting on incidents’ correction and mitigation, the
urgeon, the anaesthetists, and the nurses, evoked variable
ontributions of knowledge, skills and attitudes, which are sum-
arized in Fig. 3. Knowledge was the most quoted competence
obilized to manage incidents, followed by skills and attitudes.
evertheless, the staff neurosurgeon, the resident anaesthetist,
nd the more experienced scrub nurse ranked skills ﬁrst. Half
f the references to attitudes came from one team member, the
urgeon.
. Discussion
In this prospective video-based observational approach, the
ays incidents were detected and then corrected or mitigated,
mphasized two complementary aspects of clinical performance.
he ﬁrst aspect is associated with an individual practitioner, which
orresponds to the non-interdependent components of an individ-
al’s performance and mainly includes practical knowledge and
kill in performing speciﬁc procedures. The second aspect is then
he interdependent aspects of performance, or the components
f OR team members’ tasks that require joint action to be com-
leted. Speciﬁc competencies that underlie a practitioner’s ability
o function as an effective team member mainly rely on behavioural
nd communication skills [15]. Our video-based self-confrontation
pproach permitted to explicitly identify these aspects of
rofessional competencies, thus constituting the bases for their
earning and integration.nt personnelles ou professionnelles, qui leur permettent d’agir professionnellement. Skill
cacement dans le bloc opératoire. Knowledge renvoie à la connaissance professionnelle
3.1. Individual practitioner task work
Failures in clinical performance occurred because some practi-
tioners had a lack of knowledge and technical skills. More precisely,
it appeared that it was rather a question of applying knowledge to
real-world situations and using personal knowledge rather than a
default of core knowledge. The residents and the less-experienced
nurse were consistently involved in quite a number of minor inci-
dents with a skill-based cause during the operation, none of which
really compromised the safety of the patient or the ﬁnal outcome
of the surgery. In addition, the proﬁle of competencies mobilized to
correct or mitigate incidents was determined by the experience of
the practitioner: the staff practitioners put skills ﬁrst and knowl-
edge second, whereas the trainees put knowledge ﬁrst and skills
second. The development of expertise depends on accurate and
detailed assessment and feedback. A direct observation of trainees
by the faculty is critical in university hospitals for teaching and
assessing clinical and communication skills. In this regard, the 2008
Institute of medicine report recommends greater supervision in
medical education to improve patient safety and education [16,17].
Many tools are available for the direct observation of clinical skills
of surgical trainees [18] or junior OR nurses [19] even though the
validity of evidence and the descriptions of educational outcomes
are scarce [20]. Future studies are then required to prospectively
evaluate these tools; one is ongoing in our academic institution.
3.2. Teamwork
Effective and efﬁcient performance of complex, interdependent
tasks necessitates that practitioners be not only highly competent
in their technical skills, but it also needs proﬁcient team members.
Indeed, merely perfecting the technical work of individual doctors
and nurses is deﬁnitely insufﬁcient to prevent most medical errors
[21,22]. Our case illustration has demonstrated that major inci-
dents are often associated with complex causality and thus what is
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trictly required in an OR is anticipation, communication and close
ooperation of all team members in their detection, correction and
itigation (i.e., not only between surgeons and anaesthetists but
lso between doctors and nurses). Competent patient care increas-
ngly requires practitioners to consider the importance of each
rofession where those representatives whose skills and exper-
ise help to optimize health outcomes. This is well illustrated in
ur case by the following correlating statements: “she (the staff
naesthetist.) is changing the parameters of the ventilator to go for
yperventilation, thus reducing brain bulging and helping me”  (the
taff surgeon); and, “all these procedures make his (the staff sur-
eon) surgery more difﬁcult, we have to help him the best as we
an to reduce the swelling” (the staff anaesthetist).
In regards to safety procedures, our data support the idea that
sing brieﬁng and checklists in the operating room improves team
erformance. Indeed, all team members continuously referred to
he surgical safety checklist when the HF researcher interviewed
hem about patient safety measures. This procedure, which has
een integrated in our practice for nearly 3 years, then gave the
mpression of being effective in improving patient safety. Such
nterpretation might be extended to other procedures that had also
een cited (e.g., the surgical site infection survey launched by the
ocal Nosocomial Infections Surveillance Committee).
.3. Lessons from incidents
Expert clinicians learn to work conﬁdently yet safely, by antic-
pating and negotiating the hazards of their work. For instance,
orineau et al., [23] observed that experts cope with task demands
y monitoring conﬂicts between the surgical intervention and the
iological laws governing the patient’s body. Long et al., [24],
ho studied the key skills and attributes of the safe and effective
linician by interviewing clinical staff, have highlighted vigilance
nd anticipation as key components of professional competency.
nticipation involves thinking ahead and envisioning possible
roblems and hazards. For example, as he expected potential brain
welling in a suspected atypical meningioma, the staff surgeon
udged necessary to enlarge the craniotomy formerly performed
y the chief resident. Similarly, vigilance involves observing all pre-
iminary signs of a potential incident and consequently engaging an
ction to prevent or mitigate it. For example, during her interview
he more experienced nurse mentioned that the amount of liquid
n the surgical aspiration collector had warned her of the risk of
ransfusion. She then immediately transmitted this to the circulat-
ng nurse so that she could be ready to rapidly engage the associated
rocedure if required by the anaesthetists. Again, the junior nurse
id not perceive these set of actions when interviewed.
Juniors learn safety skills by trial and error, or by observing
xperts recover from dangerous situations. In healthcare unlike
any other high-risk industries, these skills are seldom explicitly
dentiﬁed or formally trained [25]. Direct video-based observa-
ion followed by self- and cross-confrontation interviews provide
bjective data for self-evaluation, correction, and feedbacks from
taff clinicians. Furthermore, the identiﬁcation of incidents and
iscussion about them help to identify simple or even more com-
lex system issues and can prevent similar ones from resulting in
ctual adverse patient outcomes for the patient in the future. More-
ver, our method also provides opportunities to implement other
pproaches to error analysis (e.g., root cause analysis [22], which
as its foundations in industrial psychology and HF engineering, is
idely applied to investigate major industrial accidents)..4. Key ethical principles
We  believe this video-based observational analytical approach
o incident management offers enormous potential for thegie 59 (2013) 142–148 147
understanding and improvement of the quality and safety of
surgery; nevertheless, it raises a number of ethical concerns. These
have been pointed out and addressed by Vincent et al., [25], and
could be summarized as follows: fear of a blame, or a disciplinary
action, and fear of promoting litigation. This is the reason why
some obligatory principles must be respected. They consist of
providing clear information, respecting the decision of team
members to participate or not, respect the quality-improvement
and educational objectives, preserving anonymity, and deleting
data after accomplishment of the objectives. Collaborating with
HF engineering professionals is also of paramount importance in
developing the utilization of the technique.
4. Conclusions and perspectives
Our preliminary experience integrating this video-based obser-
vational and analytical approach in our OR safety program has
been positive and productive. It helped us to obtain a better
understanding of how incidents become apparent and why deci-
sions and actions of the individuals as well as whether or not
the entire team make sense in the context. Self-confrontation
interviews promoted self-improvement among team members.
Cross-confrontation interviews gave practitioners the opportunity
to recognize the contribution of each profession to patient care.
It encouraged communication and respect within the team, but
also enlightened new considerations that would entail change and
further objectives for our future work.
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